Endogeneity affects the interpretation of my results unless household structure is recursive to the labor demand function. However, I argue that the main concern with household composition is not economic, but statistical endogeneity. Omitted variables may be correlated both with measures of household structure and labor demand. Consequently, this source of misspecification draws further attention during estimation.
Section 5 catalogs the estimation results. With a few minor exceptions, the separation hypothesis is not rejected. The specification of the labor demand function is subjected to extensive testing. Concerns of functional form, aggregation, measurement error, and simultaneity are addressed with no substantive effects on the conclusions. Finally, to address the issue of differing efficiency of family and hired labor more directly, in Section 6 I devise and implement a different test of separation. This test reinforces my conclusions in Section 5: household structure may affect the composition of farm employment (family versus hired), but farm employment is determined according to neoclassical labor demand theory. Section 7 offers some conclusions.
AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD MODELS

The Separation Result
Rather than present a general version of the model, I focus on the more stylized model which underlies the empirical work.3 The first component is a twice differentiable, quasi-concave household utility function defined over consumption c, and leisure 1: Uh = u(c, 1; a). The vector a parameterizes the utility function and summarizes household characteristics, such as the number of people in each age and sex category. In this paper, a is treated as exogenous. I address the implications of this assumption for the test later in the paper.4 The second component is a twice differentiable, convex production function: q = F(L; A), where labor L is the sum of family and hired labor, LF + LH, and land A is assumed fixed and exogenous. Other variable inputs are subsumed in the analysis.
The market is a critical part of the model. The prices of hired labor LH and off-farm labor Lo are equal to w. The household has a time endowment T(a) and exogenous income y. All prices are normalized by the output price. The farmer allocates his family's time between leisure, work on the farm, and work off the farm. He can also purchase labor to produce output that he sells in a 3 See Lau, Lin, and Yotopolous (1978) for a more formal presentation of the AHM. Further early examples of agricultural household models can be found in Barnum and Squire (1979) , Rosenzweig (1980) , Strauss (1982) . The volume by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986) provides several excellent examples of the diversity of problems that can be tackled in this framework. 4 See Pollak and Wales (1979) and (1981) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and (1986) for discussions of the issues involved in analyzing utility functions conditional on household structure. The operative word here is "conditional": there is no presumption of comparing utility levels of households with different demographic profiles except as regards their observable consumption behavior. 
Previous Studies of Nonseparation
While commonly employed in the study of farmer behavior, it is rare that the separation hypothesis is tested. Yet, the role of demographic variables in nonseparating models has been recognized since the model was first developed. Chayanov emphasized the role of demographic composition as a determinant of the "subjective equilibrium" for peasant households where there was no labor market. For these households, the level of farm labor and farm output depends on family size. Nakajima (1968) introduced Chayanov's ideas to modern economics and formalized his ideas further. Sen (1966) outlines a similar model, and shows that certain preferences and technology can lead to a perverse situation where household labor supply and farm production are independent of household size, even in the absence of labor markets.
A recent empirical paper that examines household behavior in the absence of labor markets is Jacoby (1988) . He estimates labor supply functions for Peruvian farm households. Estimated marginal products of labor on the farm (shadow wages) are the relevant decision variables for farm labor supply. Because the shadow wages are endogenous to the household's supply and demand for labor system, Jacoby employs such variables as village characteristics and household composition to instrument the marginal products. His paper shows that demographic variables play a vital role in the determination of household labor supply and farm output where labor markets are almost nonexistent. Lopez (1984 Lopez ( , 1986 provides the first explicit test of nonseparation. His test is motivated by commuting costs that drive a wedge between the returns to on and off-farm employment. Lopez uses standard nonnested hypothesis techniques to compare separating and nonseparating models. Essentially, he tests whether on-farm labor returns are significant determinants of consumption behavior. Since the model is estimated with Canadian census division level farm data, it is not clear how his results would generalize. More importantly, the testing procedure is sensitive to misspecification, whether statistical or of functional form, and it is difficult to interpret a rejection of separation. Though cast in a more restrictive framework, Arayama (1986) implements a separation test akin to that developed in this paper. Since individuals usually work 40 hours per week, Arayama suggests this is evidence of constraints on off-farm labor supply. Farmers could turn to their farms for extra work. Using district level Japanese data he tests for the effect of family size on the hours of family labor supplied to the farm. In a situation where hired labor is important to production, this is not a very revealing test. Those who own farms tend to work on their farms. This cannot be interpreted as a violation of separation, since the mix of family and hired labor is theoretically indeterminate. A more informative test is whether total labor use is influenced by household structure, not just family labor.
The study by Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986) is closely related to this study. In addition, the data employed in their paper are drawn from an earlier SUSENAS 1978 survey. Their paper explores the relationship between farmer health and farm profits. An important input in their framework is a test of separation: if labor can be hired as a substitute for family labor, then farm profits should be unaffected by farmer illness. In principle, this can be tested by determining whether farmer health affects farm profits. The authors find that while illness adversely affects farmer labor supply, farm profits remain unaffected. This test provides indirect evidence that the separation hypothesis is valid.
My paper extends and magnifies these previous studies through its explicit focus on farm labor allocation. Since I have data on actual labor used on the farm, both family and hired, I can implement a more direct test of separation. In addition, with farm level wage data, the role of prices can be more accurately determined than in the other studies. I will argue that the demographic variables provide an especially powerful means of identifying nonseparation. The test has power against an assortment of alternative hypotheses. For example, the Pitt and Rosenzweig test has power against the imperfect substitutability of family and hired labor. They were primarily looking for evidence that family labor could not be replaced by hired labor. The test in this paper has power against this alternative, as well as the opposite hypothesis that farmers are constrained in their off-farm opportunities.
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND LABOR DEMAND
In this paper, identification of nonseparation relies on the observation of a correlation between demographic composition and observed farm employment. The economic mechanism underlying this correlation is the convolution of household labor supply and demand. While nonseparation can result from any violation of the above assumptions, imperfect labor markets and differing efficiencies of family and hired labor have most often been suggested as alternative hypotheses. To evaluate evidence regarding separation, I must assess the power of the test in detecting these violations, especially with "real world" data. I consider three simple models. First, the "surplus labor" model is examined, where constraints on off-farm employment opportunities affect onfarm employment decisions. Second, a case where there are constraints on hiring-in is examined. Finally, I consider a more general model where the off-farm wage wo differs from the hiring-in wage w1. This model offers a means of interpreting differing efficiencies of family and hired labor.5
Case 1: A Binding Constraint on Off-farm Employment Hart (1986) illustrates a common view of rural labor markets in her study of labor allocation in a Central Javanese rice village. Here, she argues that economic theory must explain why "despite some sensitivity to demand conditions, rural wages fail to adjust downward in the face of considerable involun-5 These alternative models are not mutually exclusive. For example, constraints could exist in the labor market while family and hired labor have differing efficiencies. Farmers might experience shortages during the peak season, and underemployment in a slack season. I have worked out the tedious details of combining these models in Benjamin (1989 If so rationed, the family can turn to its own farm for further employment until it achieves household equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates this equilibrium. If the ration does not bind, even with constraints in the external labor market, observed labor demand, LD, will correspond to L*. While we would expect less hired labor in this situation, we would not observe nonseparation. Under these circumstances, my test lacks power to detect the constraint. When the ration binds, the amount of labor used depends on both preferences and technology. It is now optimal for the farmer to choose from labor LD past the point where F1(L; A) = w. The wage that would have induced the farmer to choose LD is defined as the shadow wage w*. Through analysis of the shadow wage and its relationship to Ls, L*, and LD we can determine how demographic variables influence the equilibrium choice of labor.
The farmer's budget constraint with the shadow wage is: Labor supply equals farm labor demand plus off-farm employment. In addition, the first order condition for profit maximization defines the shadow wage: Since the compensated labor supply elasticity dLsc/dw is positive, and the labor demand elasticity is negative, the denominator is unambiguously positive. The sign of the numerator depends on the total effect of a change of family structure on labor supply. This includes a change in M. The shadow wage falls if there is a net increase in available labor supply with a change in family structure. This will depend on how the demographic variables enter the utility function and time endowment.9 For example, if an increase in family size increases labor power more than it raises demands on leisure time, the shadow wage will fall. The preceding analysis expresses the observed effect of demographic variables on labor demand in terms of the underlying preferences and technology. While the total effect is indeterminate in general, we can say the following. Changes in demographic structure will influence labor demand unless: (i) the labor demand schedule is "flat," -17rrl = 0, or (ii) labor supply does not respond to demographic structure. It is also worth noting that both the available labor time and the "conditional fixed income" depend on H. Households with higher H ceteris paribus will have higher income and lower available time, so if leisure is normal we expect less "excess labor" to be applied to the farm. Clearly, the power of the test diminishes as H is higher.
In the above discussion I have ignored an additional source of correlation between demographic variables and labor demand. The ration H, and whether it binds, is treated as exogenous. However, differentiating the rationing condition with respect to a yields the condition that if dLs/da > 0, rationing is increasing in a. For example, larger households might be rationed more often. The model could be extended to allow the ration to depend on the age or gender composition of the household, with perhaps younger, more female households being rationed more often. The above analysis provides the basic apparatus by which the equilibrium of the farm household can be examined to determine how it responds to changes in demographic variables. Labor demand exceeds available hired labor L plus family labor supply. Figure  3 illustrates this condition. Because the marginal product of labor exceeds the market wage, it will be optimal for the family to apply labor to its own farm until the shadow wage equilibrium is achieved: Similar differentiation to Case 1 will yield an identical expression for dw*/da, and thus dLD/da. Of course, the derivatives are evaluated at different points. However, the same conditions apply in determining whether an increase in family size leads to an increase in observed farm employment. In addition, the ration condition itself implies that large households may be less likely to be constrained as defined by (8).
Case 3: Differing Returns to On and Off-farm Employment A more general approach to nonseparation is to consider hired and family labor as having different prices. Let wo be the off-farm wage for family labor and w, be the cost of hiring labor. While w1 and wo might be market determined prices, they could represent the implicit wage of using labor of differing efficiencies. Let one hour of hired labor be perfectly substitutable but equal to a hours of family labor. Measured in family-labor equivalent efficiency hours: Le = LE + aLH. To hire one hour of family labor, 1/a hours of outside labor must be hired. Therefore, one hour of hired "family labor" costs w/a wh(= w). Unless a = 1, the two types of labor have different effective wage rates. If a > 1, hired labor is more efficient and wh < w (or w, < wo). If a < 1 the situation is reversed. Two subcases need to be examined, depending on the relative prices of the two types of labor.
Subcase 1: wo > w1. This yields a weaker form of separation. The budget constraint is 
Description of Data
The data set used in this study is a sample of 4117 households from rural Java drawn from the 1980 SUSENAS household survey. The data appendix describes details of data set construction. Clusters form the sampling frame and can loosely be interpreted as villages. The 858 clusters are drawn from 85 kabupatens (counties) of Java. Where possible, I exploit the spatial nature of the data. Table I outlines the economic activities of the households in my sample. The most important thing to note is that 62% of households have land, and 44% grow wet rice. So while rice farmers are a large fraction of the sample, the a Labor force rate is defined as the fraction of household members over 10 years of age in the labor force. The definition of the labor force follows Bertrand and Squire (1980): all adults over 10 years of age excluding those who worked less than 20 hours a week who do not want to work more, and those working without compensation for nonrelatives or members of other households.
power of my test to detect wider labor market imperfections will be restricted to observable effects on rice farmers. Table I emphasizes the diversity of household economic activity for both landless and landed households. 75% of landless households and 50% of landed households engage in wage labor at some point in the year. Small scale enterprises, as well as the rice farms, round out the economic portfolio of these households. Tables II and III, which b Hired labor refers to whether any labor was hired for employment on the rice farm. c Wage employment last year refers to whether the household received any wage income in the previous year (corresponds to Table I ).
d Nonagricultural employment refers to whether the household received any income besides agricultural income (through activities in any of the other categories outlined in Table I ).
e From the labor supply side of the survey, whether or not any member of the household engaged in off-farm employment activities in the previous week. dens, fish ponds, livestock, and other agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises. Therefore, I am not testing for separation of the household from its entire economic activities, only the rice enterprise. Again, the test has power if it is this type of labor that provides the source of additional employment for constrained farmers.
These simple tables of means provide no prima facie case against separation: there is an active labor market where households engage in both the hiring and selling of labor. Nor is this evidence in favor of separation. Abey, Booth, et al. (1981) , Lluch and Mazumdar (1985) , and Hart (1986) assert that slack season conditions and underemployment are the predominant features of rural labor markets. We cannot yet discern whether farmers turn to their farms for extra employment, or whether separation is violated more subtly by differing efficiencies of hired and family labor.
Empirical Specification of Labor Demand
The theory outlined above suggests the following empirical strategy. Under the null hypothesis of separation, farmers choose L to set F1(L; A) = w. The alternative hypothesis is that they deviate from this rule, and that this deviation is correlated with family structure. In other words, they use another rule to determine L, acting as if they set F1(L; A) = w*, where w* is a function of household composition. The simple theory and the more complicated data must now be brought together. First, I develop a stylized empirical model that closely matches the theoretical model above. This model adequately describes labor allocation decisions. Subsequently, I relax some of the simplifying assumptions to determine the robustness of the results.
LD, total farm employment, is the variable to be explained. This would ideally correspond to total person-days of labor used on each farm. However, two types of labor are excluded from this aggregate. First, harvest labor is excluded since it is rarely traded on a spot market at a fixed wage." Second, I exclude plowing labor because it is a convolution of labor and draft-animal or tractor services (notice the high wage rate). The SUSENAS data regarding draft animals and tractor services are poor, so the simplest solution to modelling this small category of labor is to exclude it.12 What remains is an aggregate of planting and weeding labor, predominantly performed by females, hoeing labor primarily performed by males, and "other" labor. Aggregation raises the question of the appropriate price or wage. While it is not fully appropriate to use one wage as the price of this aggregate, I chose the planting wage as the measure of the cost of labor. This choice yields the largest sample of wage observations and represents the actual wage of a large fraction of the labor employed. To assess the biases induced by this choice, I separately model the allocation of male and female labor in a subsequent section. Note also that an incomplete sample arises from the choice of any wage.13 While it is impossible to estimate a wage elasticity for those farmers with incomplete wage observations, the independence of labor allocation from household structure remains testable.
My measure of LD masks another type of employment variation. Agriculture is characterized by peak and off-peak seasons, both within and between growing 11 The allocation and compensation of harvest labor, often performed on a share basis, is itself an interesting question. See Case (1988) for a discussion of some of the issues involved.
12 It should be noted that the exclusion of harvest labor and/or plowing labor does not affect the results or conclusions of this study, but rather makes the empirical model more closely resemble the stylized theoretical model. See Benjamin (1989) for results including plowing labor, for example. 13 Indeed, I cannot estimate a labor demand regression for farmers who do not report either a wage or labor use. Of the 1681 farmers in the sample, 6 do not report any nonharvest labor use. A further 92 do not report using hired labor: these may be the rationed farmers. In addition, 146 farmers did not hire planting labor, leaving a total of 1443 farmers with a complete set of labor and wage observations. periods. It may be the case that farmers experience different regimes over the year. Any regime that predicts no hired labor can be ruled out as holding year round since most farmers hire some labor. Unfortunately, we only observe total labor use over the growing period, not by peak and off-peak seasons. Labor demand over the year will be the sum of labor demand during "separating" days S, and "nonseparating" days S': 15 In order to precisely estimate a shadow wage function, it would be appropriate to include land as an argument in w*. However, as the object of this paper is to test for separation, rather than estimate w* per se, it is sufficient to rely on the demographic variables to identify nonseparation subject to the caveats above. As it turns out, allowing for more complicated interactions of demographic variables and land does not affect my empirical conclusions.
where ni is the number of members in each of D demographic categories: males and females, both prime-age and over 55. The coefficient on log n can be directly interpreted as the elasticity of labor demand with respect to family size. For elasticities with respect to specific types of household members, the formula in terms of the underlying parameters is given by 
Effects of Endogenous Household Structure
Since this test of separation hinges on the interpretation of the effect of demographic variables on labor demand, it is important to consider the consequences of endogenous household structure on the validity of the test. Endogenous household structure, whereby family composition is modeled as a choice variable, diminishes the validity of the comparative statics presented in the theoretical section. However, the basic intuition of the separation result remains: household size and composition should not affect farm level activities such as labor allocation, unless there is a violation of the assumptions underlying the separation hypothesis. Furthermore, the power of the test still depends on whether the labor demand schedule slopes downward, and whether household labor supply increases with family size. For my purposes, I am more concerned with the statistical than the theoretical consequences of endogenous household structure.
Consider the following simple statistical model: logL = a1 + y1 logA +81logw +8logn +E1, Table V . These elasticities are small and generally statistically insignificant. For prime age males or females, an elasticity of 0.01 implies that adding such a person to the household increases annual labor demand by 0.8%, or about half a day at the mean. Given that prime age males and females supply nearly 275 person days of labor per year to all activities, this is a small effect. Alternatively, using the wage elasticity of -0.3, adding a prime age male is equivalent to reducing the wage by 2.5%. 17 With a t statistic of 2.5 (insignificant using the Schwarz criterion),18 the most significant effect on labor demand is the presence of children under 15. Adding a child to a household increases labor use by 1.5 days. This is also a small effect. Still, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the child labor market might be less developed than the adult market. The separation hypotheses would not hold then. However, given the small size of these effects, I do not think there is sufficient evidence to abandon the separation hypothesis. It would be an overstatement to claim that labor demand schedules were misspecified lacking controls for family size.
Full Specification OLS
Even with a limited data set, accounting for all the factors that influence farm labor allocation would fill many pages. However, a richer specification of labor demand has the benefit of controlling for additional heterogeneity that could bias my conclusions, besides providing intrinsic insight into farm labor demand. Column 2 shows the results for the base regression for the specifications that follow.19 The inclusion of the extra variables does not alter conclusions regarding the demographic and wage effects. The new regression includes controls for whether the farm is not irrigated (as opposed to partial or full irrigation). Nonirrigated farms use significantly less labor, even controlling for area harvested. Fertilizer and pesticide prices also have a significant effect on labor demand, suggesting that labor is a substitute for these inputs.20
Even with separation, not all household characteristics should be excluded from the labor demand function. Measures of farmer human capital probably affect farm management. These measures may be correlated with family structure, their omission biasing my conclusions. I therefore include controls for the age and education of the household head. I only report the F statistic for the joint test of significance of the education effects, but the underlying coefficients suggest that labor use increases with the level of education. The coefficients are jointly significant. Without further theory and more directed empirical study, interpretation of this effect is pure conjecture. It is important to note that the strongest effects apply only to the 4% of rice farmers with more than elementary school. Only one coefficient is individually significant. The age profile shows rising labor use with age, but neither of the age coefficients is significant.
Finally, as a crude control for unobserved land quality, particularly for the 2SLS specifications that follow, I include indicators of kabupaten soil and climate type. I also include an indicator of whether the kabupaten was a sugar regency, an indirect indicator of the level of agricultural infrastructure according to Geertz (1963) . While the variables themselves are significant, their inclusion does not affect the demographic coefficients.
Regarding the demographic variables themselves, the F test shows they are jointly insignificant and none of the individual coefficients is significant. The only change from the simpler specification is that instead of children having the most significant elasticity, it is elderly males that have the largest elasticity. The elasticity for elderly males (over 55 years old) corresponds to an additional 3.5 days per year for an additional person. Again, this is not a large effect, but it is conceivable that markets for the older laborers may be less efficient.
OLS Excluding Children
Unobserved characteristics of the farm, such as land quality, that are correlated with farm income and labor demand, may lead to a spurious correlation between family composition and labor demand. One simple way to allow for this possibility is to exclude children from the definition of the household and include only potential workers. Column 3 of Table IV shows results of this specification. The conclusions are almost identical, but the implied demographic elasticities are slightly smaller, suggesting that there may have been a small amount of heterogeneity. Since it makes little difference, all members will be included in measures of household composition for the remainder of the paper. This increases the power of the test.
Within-Cluster
Column 4 presents results of within-cluster estimation that removes cluster fixed-effects. This meets two objectives. First, it allows estimation over all farms, including those who hired no labor and lack a wage variable.2' Second, it removes cluster level heterogeneity that may be correlated with household size. With the more inclusive sample, the demographic variables still do not influence farm labor allocation. Further, the demographic elasticities change little from the previous specifications. To determine the potential bias on the wage elasticity treating the planting wage as the "price" of labor, I examined male and female labor separately. This approach also captures some within-growing season variation of labor demand. The tasks that so far have comprised labor are hoeing, weeding, planting, an-d other labor. The SUSENAS survey does not distinguish between male and female labor, but weeding and planting are generally regarded as female tasks, while hoeing is predominantly male. Since the weeding and planting wages are almost identical, I treat the planting wage as the "female" wage and the hoeing wage as the "male" wage. A system of labor demand equations was estimated for the two types of labor (results not shown).
The most striking featuresr of these equations are the strong own-price elasticities and zero cross-price effects. The cross-price effects were individually and jointly insignificant with F(2, 1146) = 0.93.23 The elasticities for each type of labor determine the elasticity for aggregate (total) labor. If cross effects are zero, the total effect of increasing each wage is given by summing the elasticities of aggregate (total) labor with respect to each wage: -0.23 + -0.07 = -0.30, where -0.23 is the female and -0.07 is the male wage elasticity for aggregate labor. If the log-linear specification is correct and there are no cross-price effects, the same total elasticity can be calculated from the individual equations. 23 The sample size is reduced to 1146 from 1443 since I have to take the intersection of the sample of farmers who use both male and female labor, and report a wage for both types.
The total effect is SMYqM + SFr1F, where SM, SF are the quantity shares of male and female labor, and the -qi are the own wage elasticities. The implied total effect from the separate equations is 0.32 x -0.28 + 0.68 x -0.36 = -0.33. This is extremely close to, and statistically insignificantly different from, the estimated effect from the aggregated equation (F(1, 1146) = 2.15) , and provides strong support for aggregating male and female labor.
If the two wages were perfectly correlated, the total effect also could be estimated by regressing labor on the planting wage alone (according to the Composite Commodity Theorem). To the degree they are not, we will get reverse omitted variables bias.24 Since the wages are highly correlated, we get an estimated effect of -0.28 in the specifications using only the planting wage. The total wage effect is underestimated by 6% (-0.28 vs. -0.30) . Because my interest is in the total effect, and other statistical concerns turn out to be greater, I continue using the planting wage alone. Aggregation also hides very little in the way of demographic effects. The demographic variables are individually and Jointly insignificant for both male and female labor.
Measurement Error:
Because I calculate the wage by dividing the wage bill by the number of days of labor, there may be measurement error. The measurement error may result in attenuation bias, or alternatively, there may be division bias that imparts a spurious negative correlation between labor demand and the wage.25 Measurements of w from neighboring farms should have the property that they are correlated with the farmer's wage but not with farm specific measurement error. Accordingly, I estimate the model by instrumental variables where the cluster average of other observations of w are instruments. Estimation is limited to clusters where there are at least two rice farmers reporting planting wages. The fifth column of Table IV shows that there is some evidence of attenuation bias caused by mismeasured wages. The Wu-Hausman test indicates that this bias is not significant at the 5% level. As well, the coefficients on the demographic variables are similar to the OLS specification.
Simultaneity Bias:
A potentially more serious problem may arise from simultaneity or omitted variables bias. Even with perfectly measured wages, we cannot confidently view the data as generated by an experiment by which farmers respond to wages sprinkled randomly from heaven. The data are more likely generated by the shifting of both labor supply and demand curves (not just shifting supply curves). An omitted variable such as local farm productivity might be correlated with the wage and impart an upward bias on the demand elasticity. A set of possible instruments exists to help assess this hypothesis. The population density of the surrounding countryside should be correlated with the wage through the labor supply side of the supply and demand system. Ideally, population density is uncorrelated with the error term.26 As a partial check, I perform a test of overidentification restrictions to see whether the instruments meet minimal exogeneity conditions. In addition, the kabupaten soil quality and climate variables, and the sugar Regency indicator, are included to control for the kabupaten level of land quality that may be correlated with the instruments. The chosen measures of population density are population per square kilometres of the kabupaten, and the presence of a large city in the kabupaten.
The IV equation for omitted variable or simultaneity bias is presented in column 6 of Table IV. The results support the view that the labor market is not completely at odds with a simple competitive model. The first stage regression (Column 2 of Table VI) shows that the measures of population pressure have a significant negative effect on wages as one would expect if a supply and demand system generated the wages. The second stage shows that there is an upward bias in the OLS equation, with the new elasticity estimate rising to a well determined -0.94. The Wu-Hausman test suggests that this bias is (marginally) statistically significant. With a value of 0.72, the overidentification test suggests no evidence against the validity of my instruments.27 Taken together, the evidence suggests this is the preferred specification.
Assessing the Scale Effect
The Inverse Relationship:
With constant returns to scale the land coefficient y should be equal to 1.0, yet it is less than 1.0 in all specifications. As shown with the translog estimates, this is not an artifact of the functional form. Actually, declining intensity of labor input with farm size has long puzzled development economists.28 Where tested, diminishing returns to scale is rejected as the explanation.29 Abey, 26 Horstmann and Rutz (1980) present demographic evidence in favor of the notion that population density in Java is uncorrelated with soil fertility. Geertz (1963) and Hart (1986) also discuss the issue of whether Javanese settlement patterns are correlated with soil fertility. The general consensus seems to be that at least at the broad (regency or county) level, it is reasonable to assume they are uncorrelated. Of course, no one knows for sure. See Benjamin (1991) for more discussion of this issue.
27 See Newey (1985) for a discussion of such tests. It is also worth noting that both instruments are statistically significant in the first stage regression. Thus the overidentification test has some power. 28 (1) Labor input is often measured as employees or family members per hectare. These "indivisibilities" in units of measurement may lead to the inverse relationship.
(2) Indivisibility of capital or other complements to labor may force small farms to choose more labor intense combinations of inputs.
(3) The quality of farm land may not be uniform. If smaller farms are of a higher quality soil, they would have higher labor input per acre.
(4) Surplus labor or rationing in the outside labor market leads to extra family labor input on the farm. This overworking will be particularly acute on small farms (Sen (1962) ).
The preceding results help address these hypotheses. ( 
Heterogeneity across Growing Seasons:
The dependent variable is annual pre-harvest farm employment. Previously I examined the consequences of aggregating different types of labor (male and female). I now investigate the consequences of aggregating crop cycles, i.e., pooling farmers who grow only in the dry season (7%), only in the rainy season (53%), and those who can plant more than one crop (multiple-cropping) (40%). A richer specification of labor demand might account for the sequential nature of the different tasks or crops, especially focusing on preharvest and harvest labor. A useful framework for that type of approach is outlined in Antle (1983) and implemented by Antle and Hatchett (1986) . My concern in this paper is more limited.30 I am concerned with the possible heterogeneity that is masked by pooling the different types of farms, and the implications for the separation test. Specifically, while the area harvested variable accounts for the scale of the rice operation, including multiple crops, we might observe different labor 30All farmers in my sample grow wet rice, so I avoid pooling wet and dry rice farmers which itself could introduce nuisance heterogeneity. markets and different interactions with those labor markets in areas where multiple cropping is prevalent.
I estimated several specifications with controls for type of growing season and interactions between the demographic variables and the seasonal structure of the crops (results not shown). Farmers who multiple crop use significantly more labor, even controlling for area harvested and irrigation. It is possible that there is some type of heterogeneity that is related to multiple-cropping. Estimated demographic effects were stronger for the multiple-cropping farms. While the demographic variables were only marginally significant at the 5% level (F(5, 1443) = 2.93) in the OLS specification, the coefficient on log household size rose to 0.25 with a standard error of 0.07. This result was not robust to other specifications, such as cluster fixed-effects, or the 2SLS correction for wage endogeneity. In the 2SLS specification, the coefficient was 0.16 with a standard error of 0.09, and the F test for the joint significance of the demographic variables was also insignificant (F(5, 1443) = 1.17). In both the OLS and 2SLS specifications, the hypothesis that the demographic effects were equal for the 3 types of farms was accepted (F(10, 1443) = 1.10 for OLS and F(10, 1443) = 0.62 for 2SLS). However, the OLS household size effect is the largest in all the specifications I estimated. While not robust enough to overturn the separation hypothesis, it warrants discussion. Given that the share of hired labor is higher on the farms in which there are more harvests, the size effect seems to suggest that to meet high labor demand in a "tight" market, family members pitch in with the farm work. This would be consistent with an external labor market in which the wage did not adjust upward.
Adjustment of Area Harvested:
So far I have cast the separation question as: conditional on area harvested, are adjustments in farm employment correlated with household composition? If we limit the question of separation to whether labor demand is independent of labor supply variables, given the area harvested, this is legitimate. To the degree that area harvested is itself adjusted in response to labor market conditions, we may miss evidence of nonseparation. For example, labor market imperfections may limit the number of crops that can be grown by a household, or with surplus labor, farmers may cultivate their land more extensively in response to insufficient off-farm opportunities. To adjust for this possible endogeneity, I instrument area harvested with measures of the amount of sawah (rice-specific land) and total land operated by the household. Note, land operated (hectares owned, rented, or sharecropped) is correlated with household composition. This could occur because of income effects on the determination of household size, or, because of imperfections in the market for farm management, limits on the size of operation may be determined by family structure. In Java, Hardjono (1987) Table VI isolates this possible effect. Here we see that the number of elderly females is marginally significant at the 5% level, with a t statistic of -2.3. This suggests that households with a lower fraction of elderly women cultivate more intensively, though the effect is small. As a group, the demographic variables are jointly insignificant. In the second stage, we see no change in the coefficients of interest. The demographic variables remain insignificant and the wage and land elasticities are approximately the same as the previous 2SLS specification. Indeed, the Wu-Hausman test rises only slightly with the additional endogenous variable. Therefore, neither from the perspective of biasing the land coefficient, nor in hiding demographic effects on area harvested, does using area harvested as the scale variable seem misleading.
TESTING FOR DIFFERING EFFICIENCIES
My suspicion is that the imperfect labor markets alternative most readily leads to a correlation between demographic variables and labor demand. The following test focuses on the differing efficiency issue. Recall the previous depiction of the efficiency relationship: L* = LE + aLH. Perfect substitutability, despite differing efficiency, is an implicit assumption. Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1986) show that this assumption is not necessarily true. Since I am looking at specific tasks like weeding, instead of a broader measure of labor that includes family supervision and farm management, the assumption of perfect substitutability is in principle more reasonable. However, in testing for equal efficiency, perfect substitutability is a maintained and (jointly) refutable assumption. The objective is to test whether a = 1. We observe L = LF + LH and so Table VII . The OLS estimate of (1 -a) is 0.009 with a standard error of 0.07, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal efficiency. The two stage least squares regression leads to the same conclusion of equal efficiency, though both the coefficient and standard errors change. The negative sign is in the direction of more efficient hired labor, as was found in Deolalikar and Vijverberg. The Wu-Hausman test indicates, however, that the difference between OLS and 2SLS is not statistically significant. The first stage regression shows households with smaller farms, and those with more family members (particularly working age males) have a higher percentage of family labor. However, as has been shown here, this does not lead to an increase in total labor use. Finally, the test of the overidentifying restrictions reiterates the validity of the demographic variables as instruments: controlling for the fraction hired, they do not belong in the regression. The statistically preferred version of the regression is also presented in Table VII , where besides instrumenting the fraction hired, I instrument the wage. The results are essentially similar.
CONCLUSIONS
Gathering together the above results, consider Chayanov's summary of the separation issue:
The whole key to the problem is in the confrontation of these two hypotheses. We ought to accept either the concept of the fictive twofold nature of the peasant, uniting in his person both worker and entrepreneur, or the concept of the family farm, with work motivation analogous to that of the piece rate system (Chayanov (1926 p. 42) ).
As Chayanov emphasizes, only in a capitalist system, that is a system with fully functioning labor markets (for family and hired labor), is the first characterization correct. The theoretical results showed that we should expect nonseparation to lead to correlation between household composition and farm labor allocation subject to two conditions: demographic effects on household labor supply, and a downward sloping labor demand function. The first condition is established in Benjamin (1989) . The focus of this paper has been the specification and estimation of the labor demand function and testing whether farm employment is uncorrelated with household composition. Accounting for possible biases that can result from imperfectly measured or nonexperimentally allocated regressors, most results point to the validity of the separation hypothesis. Where separation is less certain, auxiliary evidence suggests that farmers might be constrained on the demand side. Together, the evidence is not consistent with surplus labor or constraints on farm labor supply, though a few qualifications must be made. The power of the test is limited by the degree that farmers turn to their farms for extra work. More importantly, 40% of households are landless and I will not observe whether they are constrained. Never- ' Overidentification test for validity of instruments: x2(4) for the specification with only demographic variables as instruments, X2(1) for wage instruments, and x2(5) for the specification with all instruments. theless, since household composition has no effect on labor demand I conclude we do no obvious wrong in treating the farm and the farmer's household separately in rural Java. 
Department of Economics
Subsample Selection
The sample was drawn from the 1980 SUSENAS survey in the following manner: (1) I drew the 16456 individual level (one per household) records corresponding to rural Java, as well as the 14765 agricultural (one per household) records. Households which were repeated or not perfectly matched in the matching information were "discarded' leaving a total sample of 13760 "good" households. Most of the nonmatches were a result of the fact that the version of the data set I am using is missing some data (agricultural records corresponding to East Java). The data are otherwise clean, and were essentially used "as is."
(2) From this set of households I selected a 30% random subsample of clusters, yielding 858 clusters with 4117 households. The smaller subsample was chosen to reduce subsequent computing expenses.
Variables in the Labor Demand Regressions
(1) The dependent variable, log L, is the natural logarithm of preharvest labor. Preharvest labor includes total person days (family and hired) of weeding, planting, hoeing, and "other" labor. The only excluded category is plowing labor, because of its convolution with draft animal services. There are a total of 1675 rice farms after removing those farms with '999' values for the labor demand data. This forms the full sample.
(2) Area harvested is total hectares of rice harvested in the previous year. (ii) The city variable is an indicator of whether the kabupaten contains a principal city (Kotamadya).
(14) The additional instruments in the final regressions are (i) the log of total land operated, and (ii) the log of total sawah (rice land) operated.
(15) Fraction hired, or "mix" is the fraction of farm employment (in person days) that is accounted for by hired labor.
